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1/3/2006 - County Decisions on Purchase of Voting Equipment
From: Lora Lavin, Representative Government Specialist, lavin@steuber.com

The December 31, 2005 deadline for counties to make a decision on purchase of new voting equipment under the requirement of the Help America Vote (HAVA) Act has arrived. Under HAVA all voting equipment used in federal elections must meet certain standards and every precinct must have at least one machine that can be used by voters with disabilities. This memorandum is an attempt to assess the situation on voting equipment replacement in Pennsylvania. I am interested hearing about what is happening in your counties.

All counties that are now using lever voting machines must replace their systems because there is no way they can be modified to meet HAVA requirements. They cannot be retrofitted to permit independent voting by people with disabilities and they do not warn voters that they have not cast all the votes they are entitled to cast.

Under the State Plan for implementing HAVA all counties that have not already done so are being encouraged to purchase HAVA compliant Direct Recording Electronic voting machines (DRE’s).

Counties that meet the December 31 deadline will receive partial reimbursement of the cost of purchasing the new equipment. If they do not meet this deadline they could forfeit the federal grant. Some counties have already made a decision on what system they will purchase. Some counties are leasing rather than purchasing. Those that have not made a decision are being asked to sign a resolution of intent so that they can remain qualified for the federal grant. In either case, the new systems are supposed to be in place in time to be used in the May 16 Primary Election.

Unlike some states that mandate using the same system statewide, in Pennsylvania the choice of a voting system is up to the counties who must also foot the bill for the costs that will not be covered by the HAVA grants. The only requirement is that the system be certified by the state.
As of now, the Pennsylvania Department of State has certified five systems. Seven other systems have been tested for certification but the certification reports have not been issued either because they have not yet received federal Independent Testing Authority approval as required by Pa law for electronic voting machines or because the certification exam was not complete. Systems by two manufacturers are scheduled for certification exams in January. The Department of State has made all the certification exams open to the public. The exam dates and reports on systems that have received state certification s are posted on the Department of State web site (http://www.dos.state.pa.us).

Some counties have involved citizens in the equipment selection process. Other counties have made a decision without any citizen involvement.
There are active citizens’ movements in some parts of the state to make counties purchase equipment that has the capability to produce a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). There have been problems with electronic voting systems in two countes. In on case the problem was with the voting equipment which has since been decertified. In the other case the problem was traced to human error. Some states have already passed laws to require VVPATs for electronic voting equipment. Bills that would mandate such a requirement are pending in the Pennsylvania General Assembly (SB977 and HB2000). Right now, in Pennsylvania the legal status of a VVPAT for use in a recount is unclear.

Of the five systems already certified for use in Pennsylvania, three were examined with a VVPAT add on. In all three cases the systems were certified only if the VVPAT component was disabled. In two cases the VVPAT is printed on a continuous scroll that could theoretically be used to trace ballots to individual voters thus violating voter secrecy requirement. The VVPAT produced by the other system could be too easily removed from the polling place thus violating law against vote selling. The other two systems do have VVPAT add-ons but these were not submitted for testing.

The League of Women Voters US position supports voting systems that are secure, accurate, recountable and accessible (SARA). The position neither supports nor opposes VVPAT’s or any other specific voting technology and leaves it up to state and local Leagues whether to support a particular system appropriate to their area. Leagues are asked to consult with LWVUS before taking a position on a specific type of voting system to ensure that the League speaks consistently (see p. 11 of Impact on Issues).

LWV New York State has decided that optical scan systems would meet these criteria and is encouraging vendors of such systems to seek certification in that state. So far no optical scan system has been certified for use in Pennsylvania but certifications are pending.

In October 2005 The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report entitled: "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed." The report concluded that the necessary activities would not be finished in time to have a significant effect in the 2006 elections and that: "Until these efforts are completed, there is a risk that many state and local jurisdictions will rely on voting systems that were not developed, acquired, tested, operated, or managed in accordance with rigorous security and reliability standards-potentially affecting the reliability of future elections and voter confidence in the accuracy of the vote count."

Counties in Pennsylvania are moving forward with voting equipment replacement and it is unlikely that a VVPAT requirement will be enacted in time to impact their decisions.

A 2003 report issued by the Congressional Research Service ("Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues)" cites three widely accepted elements of defense against security risks: technology, personnel and operations.

A 2004 LWVUS Ed Fund publication ("Safeguarding the Vote") points out that in the 2002 Florida election, officials "discovered the cost of focusing on technology without equal emphasis on personnel and operations. One county purchased all new electronic voting systems only to discover in the 2002 gubernatorial primary that its process for administering the new machines was flawed – ballots were incorrectly loaded – and its poll workers had not been adequately trained on how to operate the new machines. As a consequence, many polls opened late and its poll workers had not been adequately trained on how to operate the new machines. As a consequence, many polls opened late and some never opened at all "

The lead up to getting new voting systems in place by Pennsylvania’s May 17 Primary Election will involve a steep learning curve for everyone involved in the election process including state, county and precinct election officials and voters. Vendors of election equipment are required to assist in the process. However, they too will face an unprecedented challenge with so many election jurisdictions around the country replacing their equipment at the same time.

"Safeguarding the Vote" makes a number of recommendations for election officials on voting system security. Local League presidents were sent a copy when the report was first issues. A copy can be downloaded from the election reform section of the LWVUS web site (www.lwv.org). Local Leagues can bring these recommendations to the attention of county election officials and use them to monitor the process in their counties. A summary follows.

ACCOUNTABILITY, OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY

  • Require bipartisan or third-party monitoring of sensitive election procedures.
  • Require tracking and documentation of all procedures from the testing of machines to the handling of ballots.
  • Require transparency in the operation and management of voting systems.

UNIFORMITY

  • Establish statewide practices for the management and operation of voting systems.
  • Require that all systems, at a minimum, have been state certified and meet all federal voluntary voting system standards.

TESTING

  • Test every voting machine to ensure it is operating properly.
  • Perform uniform, public testing of voting systems.
  • Verify that the electronic and optical scan machines used are the same as the systems that were certified.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF VOTING SYSTEMS

  • Restrict physical access to all components of voting systems.
  • Maintain and operate voting systems in isolation from networks and the Internet.

PREPARATION PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY

  • Educate voters on the use of all voting equipment both in advance of the election and in the polling place on Election Day.
  • Provide adequate training for all Election Day workers.

ON ELECTION DAY

  • Ensure adequate technical support to poll workers on Election Day.
  • Provide a back-up plan in the event of machine failure.

AFTER ELECTION DAY

  • Design a routine process that checks for problems that may have occurred but not been visible on Election Day.

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